

RIPE Meeting April 2006

Security Issues in ENUM

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
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
Security Issues in ENUM

- **Basics**
ISDN, SIP
- **ENUM**
- **DNS**
Security of the DNS-Infrastructure
DNSSEC
- **Open and Closed SIP-Platforms**
- **Problems of Specification and Implementation of
ENUM/DDDS**
- **Summary and Recommendations**


ISDN Connection (I)



ISDN Connection (II)



ISDN Connection (III)



ISDN Summary

Szenario: ISDN–Telephonie:

- Addressing of calling line numbers according to E.164
- Each MSN (Multiple Subscriber Number) is configured in a switch and mapped onto a fixed port.
- With testing the related D-Channel Parameters it is possible to verify whether the Calling Party Number is
 - a) *network provided*
 - b) *user provided and verified*
 - c) *default*
- With this feature, a powerful mechanisms is given to verify and authenticate at the destination side the calling number of the caller.

ENUM and SIP

Scenario: IP-Telephony with SIP


Possibilities in addressing a subscriber:

- **SIP URI / SIPS URI (Secure SIP = SIP over TLS)**
localpart@domain, e.g. To: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.example.com>
it is also possible to specify a telephone number,
Interpretation in accordance with the local guideline of the domain,
e.g.: To: Jim <sip:+4961514711@sip-to-isdn-gateway.net>
- **TEL URI (Extension regarding RFC 2806)**
International Telephone number according to E.164,
To: Jim <tel:+49-6151-4711>
- Desirable, for reusing of well-known numbers
Necessary with **Interconnection of ISDN** (TE can deal digits only)
- **SIP Implementations have to support SIP und SIPS, only**


Target:

ENUM: Converting E.164 → SIP URI (or others) by utilising the DNS


ENUM and SIP (I)




ENUM and SIP (II)



ENUM and SIP (III)




ENUM and SIP (IV)



ENUM and SIP (V)

Target ENUM:

Converting E.164 → SIP URI (and others) by utilising the DNS



ENUM Standardisation

Target ENUM:

Converting E.164 → SIP URI (and others) by utilising the DNS

- **RFC 2916 (09/2000): E.164 number and DNS**

First RFC for ENUM

20 Pages

Registration and Search of E.164-Nummern in the DNS, NAPTR record

Replaced by RFC 3761

- **RFC 3401 - 3406 (10/2002): Dynamic Delegation Discovery System**

Generalised Concept for generic address mapping

DNS is one solution among other (theoretically possible) databases

Not all concepts are completely mature

- **RFC 3761 (04/2004): ENUM as an application of the DDDS**

Together with the DDDS specification: 105Pages

ENUM Scenarios

- **Consideration of the mapping on auf DNS server structures for “open” Scenarios**
Dependencies from external Naming Server Operators
- **Analysis of alternative network configurations: „closed” SIP Platforms**
From the public Internet-DNS separated private „Infrastructure ENUM“
Scenarios for Interdomain -Routing
Using of non-terminal roles
- **Connection of open and closed platforms**
Mixed-Scenarios consisting of **Infrastructure ENUM** (for network internal calls) and **User ENUM** (for calls to and from other networks)
Minimal requirement: Ensure at least network internal calls

ENUM-Configuration

„open network“

■ RFC 3761

ENUM-entries for public E.164-Nummern below the DNS root „e164.arpa.“, in the public Internet-DNS visible ENUM/DDDS-Mechanism can be used below other roots, but it is not allowed to call it in this case ENUM

■ DENIC eG

ENUM-Trial till December 2005,

9.4.e164.arpa. (currently) delegated to DENIC

Direct registration of single calling numbers of end customers

this is line with the **registration** for .de-Domains

NAPTR-data records are visible worldwide in the Internet

→ **Approach “open Internet”**

E.164-number allocation separated from network access / transport service

DNS-Infrastructure supports to find an UA, the rest: End-to-End

→ **Problems:** data protection, DoS-attacks , VoIP-Spam, ...

Analysis of DNS server structure

Problems of DNS server structure

■ Integrity of queries

A compromised or misconfigured Server in the tree

→ Wrong response on an DNS query

Taking advantages of weaknesses in the implementation and in the LAN

DNS Cache Poisoning


DNS Spoofing

■ Proposed solution: **DNSSEC**

DNS Security Extensions RFC4033-4035 (März 2005)

Protection of the integrity of DNS-entries with digital signatures
pre-configured public keys in resolvers (Trust Anchor)

DNSSEC



DNSSEC

Questions about DNSSEC

■ **Administrative Problems of a global PKI**

Distribution of new (Root-) keys

→ How to replace pre-configured keys in the resolver?

Signature of keys for each new delegated zone necessary

Change of keys requests also a modification in the higher-ranking zone

■ **Some weaknesses still exists**

Sensitivity against DoS Attacks

Weaknesses in the implementation

■ **Protecting the confidentiality of the entries not possible**

This method is based on established DNS

However, in particular important for ENUM

DDDS Regular Expression

Plain implementation

```
4.1.1.1.9.4.e164.arpa. IN NAPTR 100 30 "u" "E2U+sip"  
"!^.*$!sip:user@carrier.de!„
```

```
+491114          delivers sip:user@carrier.de
```

→ **Capabilities of Regular Expressions are not used**

Implementation of number ranges

```
*.2.1.9.4.e164.arpa. IN NAPTR 100 30 "u" "E2U+sip"  
"!\\+49123(\\d)(\\d*)^$!sip:\\2@sip-proxy\\1.de!„
```

```
+4912345        delivers 5@sip-proxy4.de  
+49123556677   delivers 56677@sip-proxy5.de
```

“Closed” SIP-Platforms

Analysis of alternative network structures

■ „CLOSED” SIP Platforms

e.g.: ETSI TISPAN, 3GPP IMS

No or limited End-to-End IP connectivity

Session Border Controller (Firewalls)

→ Application Layer - Routing-Mechanism (...Interdomain) necessary

Assumptions

From the public Internet-DNS separated „private” ENUM/DNS

Managed by a carrier or a group of carriers


Request from the Internet limited or not possible

Questions


Applicability and Security of ENUM in „closed” Platforms

May **concepts from the SS7-world** (like Carrier-ID's, LNPS) be applied?

“Closed” SIP-Platforms



Network Structure: #7-Network



SIP- Interdomain Routing

Interdomain Routing between closed SIP-Platforms

- **No End-to-End IP-Connectivity**

 - Routing of SIP-messages between Carrier on an Application Layer


 - if necessary via Transit-Provider

Media streams not considered here


- **Centrale Infrastructure ENUM (Group of Carrier):
Calling number -> Carrier ID**

SIP-Routing based on Carrier ID with local ENUM/DNS split horizon

- **Two-step resolution** possible via non-terminal records



„Open“ und „closed“ Platforms




“Open” und “Closed” Platforms

Interconnection of open SIP-platforms

- IP-based Interconnection between SIP-Platform inside the Internet and closed platforms (via Session Border Controller SBC)

Problems:

- Assigned calling number ranges
- Porting or transferring of customers
- Closed Platforms: Internal Calls independent from User-ENUM



ENUM/DDDS: Recognition of loops

Non-terminal NAPTR records: Risk in creating loops

Example

Name server „Carrier A“

```
*.1.9.4.external-carrier-enum.carrier-a.net. IN NAPTR 100 10 "" "E2U+sip"  
"!^\+491(\d)(\d)$!\2.\1.1.9.4.external-carrier-enum.carrier-b.net.!" .  
  
+49123 delivers 3.2.1.9.4.external-carrier-enum.carrier-b.net. (non-terminal)
```

Name server „Carrier B“

```
3.2.1.9.4.external-carrier-enum.carrier-b.net. IN NAPTR 100 10 "" "E2U+sip"  
"!.*!3.2.1.9.4.external-carrier-enum.carrier-a.net.!" .  
  
+49123 delivers 3.2.1.9.4.external-carrier-enum.carrier-a.net. (non-terminal)
```

→ DNS/ENUM/DDDS-Client in an infinite loop!

Remedy: Introduction of a counter, stop after 5 cycles
(draft-ietf-enum-experiences-03.txt)

ENUM/DDDS: Implementability

Status

- **Specification of further features of DDDS and their usage for ENUM is very complex, incomplete, incorrect, contradictory**
- **draft-ietf-enum-experiences-03.txt**
 - Collection of problems and questions, e.g.
 - Processing of order/ preference/ non-terminal Resource Records
 - Loops
 - Character Sets
 - Recommendation for Server- and Client behaviour
 - Simplification and Restricting of non-terminal roles
- **In test and field environment mostly plain implementation**
- **ENUM/DDDS implemented differently**
 - Some hard phones can only perform 1:1 conversions
 - SER e.g. can not process non-terminal roles
- **IETF: Re-examining or improvement of the specification open (doubtful)**

RR: Resource Record
SER: SIP Express Router

Summary and Recommendations I

- **User-ENUM below e164.arpa as part as the open Internet DNS**
 - Dependency on name server provider and their security measures
 - DNSSEC solve some problems, but a large propagation is still open
 - In principle, entries are public available
 - Compatibility with classical business not clear yet

- **Recommendations**
 - Creating an own infrastructure, if possible independently from User-ENUM
 - DNSSEC below 9.4.e164.arpa (for Germany)

Summary and Recommendations II

■ Infrastructure-ENUM for closed platforms

- Non-terminal RR for Interdomain-Routing in principle imaginable
- (Uniform) Implementation of non-terminal records and their future in the IETF-Standards is still an open issue.

■ Recommendation

- Replacement of non-terminal NAPTR-RRs with mechanism in the Resolver, locale name server, DNS-Provisioning system or databases.

■ Customer

As far as telephony services are concerned, the customers as well as the service provider expects a service with high quality and high reliability. All of them have learned from their experience with the PSTN/ISDN.

Colophon

All statements in this presentation results from a project to analyse the security issues of ENUM. Among others, one focus was a comparison with PSTN.

In the presentation no statements about the technology strategy of Deutsche Telekom T-Com are given.

Thank you very much
for your attention

